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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, 
GARY WORTHINGTON and EDWIN N. 
KIMBALL, general partners, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A ENTER-
PRISES, an Arizona partnership, 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF ARIZONA, 
N.A., STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
Case No. 20674 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Notice of Lien was properly verified 
as required by UCA, 1953 Section 38-1-7. 
2. Whether the amendment which eliminated the 
verification requirement has retrospective effect. 
3. Whether the amendment is unconstitutional. 
4. Whether the interest award in the arbitration 
proceeding was a penalty and hence, inappropriate. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Worthington and Kimball 
Construction Company, a Utah General Partnership, Gary 
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners, 
hereinafter Worthington 4 Kimballj sought to foreclose its 
Notice of Lien claiming priority over the Deed of Trust of 
Defendants/Respondents First Interstate Bank of Arizona, 
N.A., and Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, herein-
after First Interstate. Worthington 4 Kimball also re-
quested confirmation of an award of arbitration. 
The claim of lien is signed and acknowledged as 
follows: 
"STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 13th day of January, 198.2, personally 
appeared before me Edwin N. Kimball, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has executed this 
notice and that he has read the contents there-
of, and the same is true of his own knowledge. 
/s/ Arnold Allred 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 6586 W. 3500 S. 
My Commission Expires: 
18 Sept. 1985 * 
The trial court held that the Notice of Lien was not 
properly verified and hence null and void (R 1130, 1132). 
3 
After the signing and entry of the Order, Judgment 
and Decree, UCA, 1953 Section 38-1-7 was changed to 
eliminate the verification requirement. 
The Court affirmed the arbitration results except the 
interest at the rate of 15% was found to be a penalty and 
was reduced to the rate of 10%. 
The arbitration award at paragraph 7 (addendum 3 of 
Worthington 4 Kimball's brief) provides: 
"The contractor is entitled to interest at 
the rate of 15% per annum on the sum of 
$377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until paid 
by owner* We select that rate in part as a 
measure of damages to Worthington and 
Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of 
the balance of the contract price." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Notice of Lien was not verified as required by 
statute. With due regard to Worthington & Kimballfs claims 
of (a) broad construction; (b) protection to furnishers of 
labor and materials and (c) substantial compliance, 
nevertheless, the requirement of verification is explicit, 
clear and mandatory under Utah case law. 
The change in the statute dispensing with the veri-
fication requirement is a change of substance, not 
procedure. UCA, 1953 Section 68-3-3 and the weight of 
4 
authority indicate its application is prospective and not 
retrospective. 
First Interstate objects to the inclusion in 
Worthington & Kimball's brief of the legislative history 
for the 1985 amendment to mechanic's lien law (addendum 8) 
as being beyond the scope of the matters presented at the 
trial. 
The amendment is unconstitutional as being 
deprivation of property without due process of law. 
The interest award of 1556 is on the face of it a 
penalty, and as such, inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NOTICE OF LIEN IS NOT VERIFIED 
AND HENCE IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE 
UCA, 1953 Section 38-1-7, sets forth the requirements 
of the Notice of Claim and states: 
ffxxxwhich claim must be verified by the 
oath of himself or by some other person.xxx,f 
The case of First Security Mortgage Co., v. C. Scott 
Hansen, 631 P2d 919 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
held the lien invalid because of lack of verification. In 
5 
this case, a statutory corporate acknowledgement was used 
in lieu of a sworn statement that the contents of the lien 
notice were true. - The Court stated that the corporate 
acknowledgement was insufficient as an oath as to the 
truthfulness of the facts giving rise to the claim of lien. 
In strictly construing the statutory requirements, 
the Court used the following language: 
"Verification is not a hypertechnicality that we can 
discount. Without verification, no lien is created. Our 
statute leaves no room for doubt as to the requirement of a 
verified notice of claim, and this Court in Eccles Lumber 
Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), stated that 
since a mechanic's lien is statutory and not contractual, a 
lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant complies with 
the statutory provisions xxx 87 P at 716 
The notice of lien claim in the instant case clearly 
lacked verification, the corporate acknowledgement being 
insufficient as an oath as to the truthfulness of tne facts 
giving rise to the claim of lien. Defendant therefore 
failed to create a valid mechanic's lien, and the trial 
court was correct in dismissing its claim. In view of this 
holding, defendant's argument that it was nevertheless in 
substantial compliance with the lien statute is 
unavailing.n 
"Verification" is defined in 92CJS AT PAGE 996 as 
follows: 
"Certifying that the statement as made is true; 
confirmation or substantiation of something 
already done; the certificate that the writing 
is true; more specifically, a confirmation of 
the correctness, truth or authencity of a 
pleading, account or other paper by affidavit, 
oath or deposition. 
6 
"Verification" includes both the actual swearing 
to the truth of the statements by the subscriber 
and also the certification thereto by the notary 
or other officer authorized by law to administer 
oaths. It is a personal ceremony. 
XXX11 
And in the pocket parts: 
f,(1) a "Verification" is an affidavit attached 
to a statement, as to the truth of the matters 
therein set forth. 
(2) "Verification" requires formal declaration 
and verification under oath bespeaks some 
further formal act or presence calculated to 
bring to bear upon declarant's conscience the 
full meaning of what he does. 
XXX " 
The acknowledgements in Worthington & Kimball's 
Notice of Lien follow closely the statutory form UCA, 1953 
Section 57-2-7 as follows: 
"State of Utah ) 
County of ) 
On this day of , 19 , per-
sonally appeared before me who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has executed this Notice 
and that he has read the contents thereof, that the 
same is true of his own knowledge. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
ft 
7 
The acknowledgement in Worthington & Kimball'3 claim 
of lien is as follows: 
"STATE OF UTAH ) 
* ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 13th day of January , 1982., personally 
appeared before me Edwin N. Kmball (sic), who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has executed this notice 
and that he has read the contents thereof, that the 
same is true of his own knowledge. 
/s/ Arnold Allred 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 6586 W. 3500 S. 
(seal) 
My Commission Expires: 
18 Sept. 85" 
Verification should be in the following form: 
"State of Utah ) 
:ss. 
County of ) 
, being first duly sworn, says that he 
is claimant in the foregoing Notice 
of Lien; that he has read said Notice and knows the 
contents thereof and that the same is true of his own 
knowledge. 
(signature) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
, 19 . 
NOTARY PUBLIC" 
The case of Graff v. Boise Cascade, 660 P2d 721, 
(Utah 1983), is also pertinent. 
8 
In this case, the lien form was signed, but the 
verification block was neither filled in as to the name of 
the person making the verification, nor was it signed. The 
Court held that the notice of claim of lien clearly lacked 
verification and that the statutory requirements have not 
been substantially complied with. 
Worthington & Kimball argues that the lien form 
substantially complies with the Utah Code and cite as 
authority the following cases: 
Firecrest Supply, Inc., v. Plummber, 634 P2d 891 
(Washington 1981) 
Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, Inc., 412 P2d 
496 (Alaska 1966) 
Anchorage Sand and Gravel v. Woolridge, 619 P2d 1014 
(Alaska 1980) 
These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Firecrest, 
ff
... registered agent signed claim, his 
name was typed in on verification identifying 
him as the claimant who was sworn, and there 
was nothing to suggest that the registered 
agent was without authority.n 
The vertification was as follows: 
"State of Washington ) 
:ss. 
County of Pierce ) 
David Perkins, registered agent, being sworn, 
says: I am the claimant xxxxx above named; 
I have heard the foregoing claim read and know 
9 
the contents thereof and believe the same to be 
just* 
/s/ Beverly C. Wilson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day 
of July 1978. 
residing in Tacoma, Wa 
(seal)" 
The jurat stated that the signer was sworn. There is 
no such statement in the case at bar. 
In Stephenson, the lien form was executed as follows: 
"KETCHIKAN SPRUCE MILLS, INC. 
By: /s/ Lyle E. Anderson 
LYLE E. ANDERSON, Manager 
Immediately below Anderson's signature was the 
following: 
UNITED STATES ) 
OF AMERICA :ss. 
STATE OF ALASKA ) 
LYLE E. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn, upon 
oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Manager of KETCHIKAN SPRUCE 
MILLS, INC., and makes this verification for and 
on behalf of said corporation; that KETCHIKAN 
SPRUCE MILLS, INC., is the claimant named in the 
foregoing clain of lien; that he has read the 
same and knows the contents thereof and that the 
same is true of his own knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day 
of March, 1962. 
10 
/s/ Veryl B. Lekander 
Notary Public in and for 
Alaska 
My Commission expires: 
9/28/64" 
Here, the jurat says that the signer "being first 
duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: xxx." There is no 
statement of swearing in the case at bar. 
In Anchorage Sand and Gravel the court found that the 
language "hereby verifies that said facts are true and 
correct" amounts to a verification. The Alaska court 
stated that to "verify" means to "confirm by oath". The 
Court held that when a lien claimant, in the presence of a 
notary, affixes his signature to a written statement 
incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of lien, 
and the notary certifies this act, claimant has sub-
stantially complied with the requirements of an "oath." 
In Worthington & Kimballfs lien form there is no 
statement that the signer made a verified statement, or was 
under oath. There is simply an acknowledgement that he 
signed it and that the contents are true. 
In discussing the requirements for an oath, the 
Supreme Court in Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P2d 29, (Utah 
1984), quoted with approval two earlier cases as 
follows: 
11 
"Some courts have held that signing an 
affidavit in the presence of a notary is sufficient 
to constitute the taking of an oath. However, this 
court has not followed that view. In Sp-angler v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, we said that to 
constitute the taking of an oath: 
There must be definite evidence that affiant 
was conscious that he was taking an oath; that is, 
there must be not only the consciousness of affiant 
that he was taking an oath, but there must be some 
outward act from which that consciousness can be 
definitely inferred. That cannot be done from the 
mere signature to a printed form of an oath. 
In McKnight v. State Land Board, the Court cited 
Spangler with approval and further set the essentials 
of an oath: 
1. A solemn declaration. 
2. Manifestation of an intent to be bound by 
the statement. 
3. Signature of declarer. 
5. Acknowledgement by an authorized person that 
oath was taken.n 
First Security Mortgage Co. v. C. Scott Hansen, 
supra, is controlling. 




THE AMENDMENT OF UCA, 1953 SECTION 38-1-7, 
DISPENSING WITH THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT IS, 
NOT RETROSPECTIVE IN ITS APPLICATION 
Throughout these proceedings, including the signing 
and filing of the Order, Judgment and Decree, the 
mechanic's lien statute required the Notice of Claim to be 
verified. The amendatory statute which eliminated this 
requirement made no provision for retroactive application. 
UCA, 1953 Section 68-3-3> as amended provides: 
"Revised statutes not retroactive. No part of 
these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." 
The general rule that legislative enactments operate 
prospectively rather than retrospectively is expressed in 
several Utah cases including Archer v. Utah State Land 
Board, 392 P2d 622, 15 Utah 2d 321 (1964); McCarrey v. Utah 
State Teachers Retirement Board, et al., 177 P2d 725, 111 
Utah 251 (1947K 
The following cases hold that there must be an 
express declaration in the legislative enactment for it to 
have retroactive effect. In re: Ingrahamys Estate, 
Petersen v. State Tax Commission, 148 P2d 340, 106 Utah 337 
(1944). Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Trustees, Inc., 
329 P2d 398, Utah (1958). 
13 
If the amendment constitutes a fundamental change in 
the adjective law as distinguished from matters of practice 
or procedure, its application is prospective and not-
retrospective. Boucofski v. Jacobsen. 36 Utah 165, 104, 
P.117 (1909). In the matter of the Disconnection of 
certain territory from Highland City, 668 P2d 544, (Utah 
1983). 
In the Highland City case (P2d 548, 549) the changed 
legislation placed the burden of proof on petitioner by a 
preponderance of the evidence and added as further matters 
for the District Court to consider the effects of the 
disconnection on the city or community as a whole and 
adjoining property owners. 
The Court held: 
"There being no provision to the contrary in 
this circumstance and the amendment being sub-
stantive rather than procedural, the general 
rule governs and the 1983 amendments do not 
apply to this case11. 
A mechanic's lien is statutory and not contractual. 
It only arises upon compliance with the statutory 
provisions. Prior to the amendment without verification no 
lien was created. Elwell v. Morrow, 78 P 605, 28 278 Utah 
(1904). First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra. 
The Court, in First Security, supra in discussing the 
14 
need for a verification held that the filing of a lien 
creates serious consequences to persons having an interest 
in real property which justifies the "statutory imposition 
of a requirement that one who makes the claim must furnish 
a sworn statement to the truthfulness of the facts giving 
rise to it. xxx Verification is not a hypertechnicality 
that we can discount. Without verification, no lien is 
created.n 
The right to a lien is a matter of substance. 
Without verification there is no lien. The elimination of 
the requirement of verification is the elimination of a 
matter of substance. 
Worthington & Kimball rely on Aviles v. Sshelman 
Electric Corporation, 379 A.2d 1227 (Maryland App. 1977). 
In affirming that lfin Maryland mechanic fs lien statutes 
create no vested rights, but are only an in rem remedy 
which can be changed or completely withdrawn at the whim of 
the legislature so as to control foreclosure actions, be 
they accrued, pending or future". The Court readily 
acknowledged that "there is a contrary view expressed by 
the courts of some of our sister states." The Maryland 
court apparently felt that the mechanic's lien law gave no 
substantive rights. First Interstate disagrees with this 
15 
position and submits that this case does not apply in Utah. 
First Interstate objects to the inclusion by 
Worthington & Kimball in its brief of references to the 
bearing of the Business, Labor Committee regarding the 
amendment. Obviously this matter was not considered at the 
trial and it cannot be presented on appeal. Utah 
Department of Transportation v. Glen E. Fuller,, et al M 603 
P2d 814, (Utah 1979). Yost v. State of Utah, 640 P2d 1044, 
(Utah 1981). Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 384 P2d 109, 14 
Utah 2d 334 (1963). 
POINT III 
THE AMENDMENT TO 
UCA, 1953 SECTION 38-1-7 IS A VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The amendment to UCA, 1953 Section 38-1-7 abolishing 
the verification requirement is an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property within the meaning of Article I 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. That section provides: 
"[njo person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process 
of law." 
The principles of due process of law and basic 
fairness go to the heart of the policy requiring 
verification of the notice to hold and claim a lien. Those 
16 
are the same principles which proscribe other prejudgment 
actions which deprive persons of, or impair their interests 
in property. The policy upon which the verification 
requirement has its foundation is stated in First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra, as follows: 
TtThe policy underlying these decisions 
is sound. A lien creates an encumbrance 
on property that deprives the owner of 
his ability to convey clear title and 
impairs his credit. The filing of a 
lien for an excessive amount could be 
used to force a settlement unfairly 
weighted in favor of the claimant. 
Such abuse is made a misdemeanor by 
Section 38-1-25. These serious con-
sequences justify the statutory 
imposition of a requirement that one 
who makes the claim must furnish a 
sworn statement to the truthfulness 
of the facts giving rise to it. Frivo-
lous, unfounded and inflated claims 
can thereby be minimized, and the pre-
judgment property rights of the 
individuals receive their due protection.!f 
A person with an interest in real property is 
entitled to the protection afforded by the requirement of 
verification before a lien claimant can impose a lien on 
real property. As this Court stated in First Security 
Mortgage Co., v. Hansen, supra, the prejudgment property 
rights of persons with interests in real property are more 
fully protected by requiring the verification of the lien 
claimant. 
17 
The elimination of verification deprives such person 
with this protection and hence deprives him of property 
rights without due process of law. It is submitted that 
the mechanic's lien statute, as amended, is an un-
constitutional deprivation of property without due process 
of law. 
POINT IV 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD OF INTEREST WAS 
PUNITIVE AND HENCE INAPPROPRIATE 
The abritration award at paragraph 7 (addendum 3 of 
Worthington & Kimball?s brief) provides: 
"The contractor is entitled to interest at 
the rate of 1556 per annum on the sum of 
$377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until 
paid by owner. We select that rate in 
part as a measure of damages to 
Worthington & Kimball for the unreasonable 
withholding of the balance of the contract 
price.ff 
It appears therefore that such an award on its face 
is punitive. The following cases indicate an award of 
punitive damages in a contract case is inappropriate unless 
an independent tort is committed. Cook v. Warnick, 664, 
P2d, 1161, (Utah 1983); Highland Construction v. UPRR Co., 
683 P2d 1042, (Utah 1984). There is nothing in the award 
justifying the imposition of punitive damages. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
The Notice of Lien not being verified as required by 
statute and case law; the amendment dispensing with the 
verification requirement being prospective and not retro-
spective; the amendment being unconstitutional and the 
interest award being a penalty, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Order, Judgment and Decree of the trial 
court as to these matters ought to be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of December, 
1985. 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents First Interstate Bank 
of Arizona, N.A., and Stewart 
Title Company of Salt Lake City 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law." 
UCA 1953 Section 38-1-7 (prior to April 29, 1985) 
NOTICE OF CLAIM - CONTENTS - RECORDING 
"Every original contractor within eighty days 
after the completion of his contract, and except 
as hereafter provided, every person other than 
the original contractor claiming the benefit of 
this chapter within sixty days after furnishing 
the last material or performing the last labor 
for or on any land, building, improvement or 
structure, or for any alteration, addition to or 
repair thereof, or performance of any labor in, 
or furnishing any materials for, any mine or 
mining claim, must file for record with the 
county recorder of the county in which the 
property, or some part thereof, is situated a 
claim in writing, containing a notice of 
intention to hold and claim a lien, and a 
statement of his demand after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, with the name of the owner, 
if known, and also the name of the person by whom 
he was employed or to whom he furnished the 
material, with a statement of the terms, time 
given and conditions of his contract, specifying 
the time when the first and last labor was 
performed, or the first and last material was 
furnished, and also a description of the property 
to be charged with the lien, sufficient for 
identification, which claim must be verified by 
the oath of himself or of some other person. 
When a subcontractor or any person furnishes 
labor or material as stated above at the instance 
and request of an original contractor, then such 
subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set 
forth herein, are extended so as to make the 
final date for the filing of a notice of 
intention to hold and claim a lien sixty days 
after completion of the original contract of the 
original contractor.ff 
UCA 1953 Section 38-1-7 (after April 29, 1985) 
NOTICE OF CLAIM - CONTENTS - RECORDING - SERVICE 
ON OWNER OF PROPERTY 
11
 (1) Every original contractor within 100 days 
after the completion of his contract, and except 
as provided in this section, every person other 
than the original contractor who claims the 
benefit of this chapter within 80 days after 
furnishing the last material or performing the 
last labor for or on any land, building, 
improvement, or structure, or for any alteration, 
addition to, repair of, performance of any labor 
in, or furnishing any materials for, any mine or 
mining claim, shall file for record with the 
county recorder of the county in which the 
property, or some part of the property is 
situated, a written notice to hold and claim a 
lien* 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement 
setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or, 
if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor was 
performed, or the first and last material was 
furnished; 
(d) a description of the property sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent, and the date signed* 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the noitce of 
lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or 
record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current 
address is not readily available, the copy of the 
claim may be mailed to the last known address of 
the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property 
assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail 
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award 
of costs and attorney's fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the 
lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes 
labor or material as stated in Subsections (1) 
through (3) at the request of an original 
contractor, then the final date for the filing of 
a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien 
for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor 
or materials at the request of an original 
contractor is 80 days after completion of the 
original contract of the original contractor." 
UCA, 1953, Section 57-2-7 
FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
"A certificate of acknowledgment to any 
instrument in writing affecting the title to any 
real property in this state may be substantially 
in the following form: 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , 
personally appeared before me , 
the signer of the above instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same." 
UCA, 1953, Section 68-3-3 
REVISED STATUTES NOT RETROACTIVE. 
"No part of these revised statutes is retoractive, 
unless expressly so declared. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
"15. That a Deed of Trust to secure an 
indebtedness on the subject building and property 
was given by First Interstate according to the 
following terms, conditions, amounts and time: 
Dated: November 1, 1981 
Trustor: C & A Enterprises 
Amount: $2,300,000.00 
Trustee: Stewart Title Company of 
Salt Lake City 
Beneficiary: First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona, N.A. 
Recorded: November 30, 1981 as Entry 
No. 848026 in Book 1393, at 
page 1305 of official 
records.tf 
"16. A mechanicfs lien was filed in Weber County 
by Gary J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba 
Worthington and Kimball in the amount of 
$430,586.15, plus interest for labor and 
materials recorded January 14, 1982, as Entry No. 
850356 in Book 1396 at page 258 of official 
records, first work day being 7/15/80 and last 
work day being 11/12/81, hereinafter designed as 
Worthington & Kimball's first mechanic's lien." 
n33. That the amount due and owing to 
Worthington and Kimball by C & A Enterprises, is 
the sum of $377,131 00, together with interest at 
the rate of 10% per annum. The court further 
finds that of this amount, $2,355.00 was personal 
property and was not properly lienable, leaving a 
balance due and owing, subject to the Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Statute of $374,776.00, together 
with interest at the rate of 10$ per annum. It 
appears to the court that the 1556 interest 
awarded in the Arbitration Award is a penalty 
and, therefore, the court is only awarding 
Worthington & Kimball 10$ interest on the amounts 
as provided herein** 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
w2. The mechanics lien filed in Weber County by 
Gary J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, to 
secure the above amounts recorded on the official 
records, as more particularly described in Weber 
County, State of Utah, as: 
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County 
Industrial Park 
is null and void and was not properly perfected 
because of the defective verification of the lien 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953* Section 
38-1-7 as amended." 
